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FINDING THE "LOST VOLUME SELLER": TWO
INDEPENDENT SALES DESERVE TWO PROFITS

UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
Section 2-708(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code' (U.C.C.),
permits a seller to recover his "lost profit" 2 on a sale when the buyer
breaches by non-acceptance or repudiation and a market resale remedy is inadequate.' A typical claim for lost profits involves the retail
merchant' who resells the goods for the same price that the original
1. U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1972). The Uniform Commercial Code ["U.C.C." or "the
Code"] was drafted between 1944 and 1950 under the joint sponsorship of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3-4 (3d ed. 1988). The
U.C.C. was a response to a growing interest in commercial law reform that was triggered by a lack of national uniformity (for example, only two thirds of the states had
adopted the Uniform Sales Act of 1906). Id. at 3. The co-sponsors named Karl N.
Llewellyn "Chief Reporter" of the Code; he was also the principal draftsman of the
Sales Article (Article 2). Id. at 3-4. The U.C.C. has been a major success in achieving
nationwide acceptance; by 1968, 49 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands were operating under the Code. Id. at 5. For a brief review of the U.C.C.'s
birth, written by the man whose idea it was to create a "comprehensive" commercial
code, see Schnader, A Short History of the Preparationand Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967).
2. See infra note 39 and accompanying text, distinguishing "profits" as a general remedy for sellers from "profits" as consequential damages.
3. Section 2-708 states in full:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect
to proof of market price (Section 2-703), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market
price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together
with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less
expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach. (2) If the measure of
damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done
then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead)
which the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer, together
with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds
of resale.
U.C.C. § 2-708.
4. The other major category of potential "lost-volume sellers" is manufacturersellers. The particular circumstances of both manufacturer-sellers and retail sellers
will be extensively discussed throughout this comment. The availability of a section
2-708(2) profit remedy to other non-lost volume sellers is a topic beyond the scope of
this comment. For general discussions of section 2-708(2), see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 313-32; Sebert, Remedies Under Article Two Of The Uniform
Commercial Code: An Agenda for Review, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 360 (1981). For an argument that 2-708(2) is the seller's primary damage remedy under Article 2, see Childres & Burgess, Seller's Remedies: The Primacy of UCC 2-708(2), 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
833 (1973). For student articles on recovery of lost profits under section 2-708(2), see
Comment, An Economic View of U.C.C. and the Identification of the Lost-Volume
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buyer had agreed to pay.' Although the breached sale has been replaced, the retailer correctly observes that he is not in as good a
position as performance by the buyer would have put him in because he has lost the profit from one sale.'
Unfortunately, section 2-708(2), which provides a remedy for
such "lost-volume sellers,"7 does not precisely indicate to whom this
remedy is available. 8 This is of special concern in Illinois because
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in R.E.
Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc.,9 recently held that under
Illinois law profits are indeed available as damages to sellers who
can show that the buyer's breach caused them to lose sales volume.1"
In this case of first impression," the court also adopted a three-part
Seller, 49 ALBANY L. REV. 889 (1985); Note, Seller's Recovery of Lost Profits for
Breach of a Sales Contract: Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-708(2), 11 Wm.
MITCHELL L. REV. 227 (1985) (lost profit damages an underused remedy available to
many sellers).
5. Where the refused goods are resold, the usual remedy would be under section
2-706 (contract price less resale price); however, when the resale price equals the contract price, the formula in section 2-706 will produce only nominal damages. If the
goods have not been resold, section 2-708(1) provides a market price-contract price
differential as the seller's remedy; again, however, if the original sale was made at the
market price, this formula yields only incidental damages. The failure of the section
2-706 and 2-708(1) remedies to produce significant damages is not, alone, reason to
approve a profit formula. It may simply indicate that the seller has suffered no harm.
Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Sellers' Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 66, 85 (1965).
6. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 315. For other general explanations of the lost-volume phenomenon and section 2-708(2), see BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE § 13.07[4 (1987); W. HAWKLAND, HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-708:04 (1986); R.
ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE U.C.C. §§ 2-709:21, 25 (1983).
7. The term "lost-volume seller" was coined by Professor Robert Harris, who in
the early 1960s authored a series of articles contrasting results in various jurisdictions
under the Uniform Sales Act and under the newly enacted Article 2 of the U.C.C. See
HARRIS, supra note 5, at 97-98; see also Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of
Seller's Damages: New York Results Compared, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1965); Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Michigan Results Compared, 61 MICH. L. REV. 849 (1963); Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's
Damagesfor Total Breach of Contract,60 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1962). Unless otherwise
noted, citations to Harris are to the 1965 Stanford article. See supra note 5.
8. The Code's text only states that the profit remedy is available if the contract
price-market price differential of section 2-708(1) is "inadequate to put the seller in
as good a position as performance would have done." U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
9. 826 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1987).
10. Davis, 826 F.2d at 681. The Illinois legislature adopted section 2-708 of the
1958 Official U.C.C. text without change. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 26, 2-708 (1987).
Although the Davis case arose under the U.C.C. as enacted by Illinois, defining the
lost volume seller is a problem of more general concern, both because Article 2 (including 2-708), is the law in 49 states and because every appellate court considering
the question has permitted lost-volume sellers to recover profit under section 2708(2).
11. The Davis court expressed surprise that, "given its importance," no Illinois
courts had yet decided the question of profit damages for the lost-volume seller. Davis, 826 F.2d at 681. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Davis case.
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test to determine who is a lost-volume seller entitled to the profit
remedy of section 2-708(2)." Like many other courts and commentators who have dealt with this question, however, the seventh circuit has embraced a test that may well overcompensate many sellers
who could be innaccurately labeled "lost-volume" sellers.
This comment will therefore discuss the general problem of the
lost-volume seller and offer a proposal to aid judges and juries in
making the difficult determination of whether a given seller has indeed lost volume. First, this comment reviews the pre-Code history
of lost profit damages-under both the Uniform Sales Act and the
common law. This will provide the historical background against
which section 2-708(2) was drafted. Second, this comment traces the
legislative history of section 2-708(2) and the problems of statutory
construction it presents, concluding that the true lost-volume seller
is properly entitled to a profit remedy. Third, this comment demonstrates the functional inadequacy of the various definitions of lostvolume seller that courts and commentators have advanced, concluding that a new test for "lost-volume seller status" is needed.
Fourth, this comment offers a new two-part test for solving questions of lost-volume seller status. Finally, the comment concludes
that Illinois courts should adopt such an approach to ensure that
the alternative damages formula of section 2-708(2) is available only
in appropriate cases of true lost-volume.
I.

PRE-CODE TREATMENT OF LOST-VOLUME SELLERS

A.

Lost-Profit Damages At Common Law

The general goal in awarding damages to sellers for a buyer's
non-acceptance of goods is to put the seller in as good an economic
position as the buyer's performance would have.' In the sale of
goods, this is ordinarily accomplished by the general formula that a
seller's damages equal the difference between the contract price and
the resale price of the goods retained as a result of the breach."'
Arthur Corbin, however, recognized that such a formula "works"
only if the buyer's rejection of the goods makes possible a replacement sale "that he [the seller] could not have made except for the
rejection."'5 Where the seller is a manufacturer with the capacity to
12. Id. at 684-85. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Davis court's lost-volume test.
13. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 591 (3d ed. 1987); accord
U.C.C. § 1-106; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344(a), 347, comment a
(1979).
14. See U.C.C. § 2-706. If the goods are not resold, however, the seller would
have to proceed under section 2-708(1) (market price-contract price differential).

15.

5 A. CORBIN,

CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

541 (1964) (emphasis added).
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fill all probable factory orders, 6 or a dealer who, through his producer, can supply all obtainable customers," a buyer's refusal to accept the goods does not itself make possible a second sale in which
the profit lost by the buyer's breach can be replaced. 8 Every sale
after the breach would have been made even if the original buyer
had fully performed under the contract. 9 The second sale is not,
therefore, a replacement sale and the only savings to the seller that
the buyer's breach makes possible is the cost of producing or obtaining the goods which are the subject of the resale.20 The seller
has, however, lost the contract price. The difference between these
two figures (contract price and cost) is the seller's "gross profit" on
the sale, and is the proper measure of recovery under traditional
contract damages theory. 1
This general principle of damages is aptly demonstrated by the
"duty" to mitigate damages in breach of employment contract
cases.2 2 Where the contract is for full-time personal labor, a court
will offset the employee's damages for an unlawful discharge by the
amount he did earn, or could have earned with reasonable effort,
during the remaining term of the breached contract. 23 The justifica16. Id. See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d 865 (1st Cir.
1982) (transistor systems); City of Louisville v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1973) (parking meters); Nederlandse Draaindustrie NDI B.V. v. Grand PreStressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846 (E.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979)
(steel).
17. A. CORBIN, supra note 15, at 541. See, e.g., Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug
Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1974) (sweaters); Kaiserman v. Martin J. Ain, Ltd.,
112 Misc.2d 768, 456 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (cars); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp.,
30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311 (1972) (boats).
18. A. CORBIN, supra note 15, at 541-42.
19. Id. at 542. As a result of the breach, the seller is able to make one sale
without any production or inventory cost. Therefore, he ought to be able to recover
his contract price less this saved "procurement cost."
20. For manufacturers, the cost of obtaining the goods is the cost of production
(labor and materials, but not fixed overhead). See Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp.,
377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967). For dealers, the cost of obtaining the goods is generally
the "wholesale price." See also A. CORBIN, supra note 15, at 542.
21. Id. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 51 Ct. Cl. 228 (1916) (cement); Nelson Equip. Co. v. Harner, 191 Or. 359, 230 P.2d 188 (1951) (asphalt paver); Willhelm
Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 197 Minn. 626, 268 N.W. 634 (1936) (oil). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347, comment f (1979) (volume seller's damage
measured by the net profit lost on a sale).
22. "Duty" to mitigate is an unfortunate and misleading phrase because the
innocent employee who "breaches" such a duty incurs no liability to the employer
who breached the contract. The employee is "simply precluded from recovering damages for loss that he could have avoided." E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 859 (1982).
Justice Cardozzo once said that such an employee loses his right to recover because
"he has broken the chain of causation" by unreasonably rejecting substitute employment, and any loss thereafter suffered is caused by his own action rather than by his
former employer. McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 358-59, 169 N.E.
605, 609-610 (1930) (Cardozzo, J., concurring).
23. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 13, at 613, 616; E. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 22, at 862; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350, comment c and
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tion for this subtraction from the value of the employer's promised
performance is that but for the breach, the employee could not have
earned the money from the second job. If these earnings are not
subtracted from his measure of recovery, the remedy would put the
employee in a better positionthan the employer's faithful performance under the contract would have put him in. This result is clearly
unacceptable under the general theory of contract damages.2
Where the contract is for the performance of a specific task,
however, one cannot assume that the contractor-employee could not
perform both the breached contract and a subsequent contract.2
Therefore, It would be inequitable to use any subsequent, additional
contracts to offset the innocent employee's recovery (and thus benefit the wrong-doing employer), unless the employee clearly could not
have performed those contracts but for the owner-employer's
breach.2" Similarly, in the case of the lost-volume seller, a resale (at
the identical price) after the original buyer's breach should not eliminate the seller's damages because the seller would have made the
illustration 8 (1979); accord Godson v. McFadden, 162 Tenn. 528, 39 S.W.2d 287
(1931); Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64 (1877).
24. See supra text accompanying note 13 for an explanation of the goal in
awarding general damages for breach of contract.
25. Where such non-exclusive contracts are involved, the contractor is free to
enter as many contracts as he can perform, regardless of whether any one of them are
breached; the full-time employee who has been discharged, however, can only obtain
other employment because the employer breached. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,
supra note 13, at 613-14: "Construction contracts are non-exclusive and a construction contractor's damages are not normally reduced by any earnings attributable to
contracts made subsequent to the breach." Farnsworth observes that courts will often
assume that a building contractor could have and would have performed both contracts. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 852-53 n.16; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 350, comment d, illustration 10 (1979).
26. See, e.g., Wired Music v. Clark, 26 Ill. App. 2d, 413, 168 N.E.2d 736 (1960)
(damages for breach not reduced by new contract for piped-in music at same location); M. & R. Contractors and Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 215 Md. 340, 138 A.2d 350
(1958) (no reduction in damages for subsequent transactions where later sales by
builder not a result of the breach); Koplin v. Faulkner, 293 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1956)
(profit made by oil driller from other work after breach not relevant in calculating
damages). Where, however, the subsequent construction contract is for the same performance, the contractor should not be allowed the benefit of both contracts; but for
the breach, the contractor could not have made the subsequent contract, which
makes it a true substitute or replacement contract. But see Grinell Co. v. Voorees, 1
F.2d 693 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 629 (1924) (no subtraction from equipment
installer's damages when breached contract with bankrupt owner was replaced by
contract with subsequent owner for same performance); see also Olds v. Mapes-Reeve
Constr. Co., 177 Mass. 41, 58 N.E. 478 (1900); The Grinnell decision is criticized in
Note, 34 YALE L.J. 553 (1925). The Olds and Grinnell cases are clearly wrong. Like
the wrongfully discharged employee, the contractors in these cases could not have
performed the subsequent contracts but for the original breach, and so the amount
earned from such substitute contracts should offset the disappointed contractor's
damages. The only possible justification for the holdings to the contrary in Grinnell
and Olds is a judicial reluctance to benefit the breaching party by an offset against
the damage he has already caused. Such a punitive policy for breach of contract has
no place in the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-106.
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second
sale even if the original buyer had not breached the first
7
sale.1

B.

Sales Act Cases

Section 64 was the general damages provision for sellers under
the Uniform Sales Act ("Sales Act").2 8 Although it did not expressly
sanction a recovery of profit for the lost-volume seller, subsections
(2), (3), and (4), in various combinations, arguably permitted a
profit remedy for the lost-volume seller. 29 Many Sales Act cases ap27. "Every new customer would have been supplied even if the buyer had kept
the goods and performed the contract." A. CORBIN, supra note 15, at 541.
28. About two-thirds of the states operated under the Uniform Sales Act before
adopting Article 2 of the U.C.C. R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, supra note 1, at 3. Section
64 of the Uniform Sales Act provides:
(1) Where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for
the goods, the seller may maintain an action against him for damages for nonacceptance.
(2) The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally
resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the buyer's breach of contract.
(3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of special circumstances, showing proximate
damage of a greater amount, the difference between the contract price and the
market or current price at the time or times when the goods ought to have
been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance, then at the time of the
refusal to accept.
(4) If, while labor or expense of material amount are necessary on the part
of the seller to enable him to fulfill his obligations under the contract to sell or
the sale, the buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, or notifies the seller to
proceed no further therewith, the buyer shall be liable to the seller for no
greater damages than the seller would have suffered if he did nothing towards
carrying out the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation of countermand. The profit the seller would have made if the contract
or the sale had been fully performed shall be considered in estimating such
damages.
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 64 [hereinafter U.S.A].
29. Some courts found a profit remedy as "the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting.., from the buyer's breach." U.S.A. § 64(2). See Smead v. Sutherland,
118 Vt. 361, 111 A.2d 335 (1955); Breading v. Champlain Marine & Realty Co., 106
Vt. 288, 172 A. 625 (1934); Popp v. Yuenger, 229 Wis. 189, 282 N.W. 55 (1938). Other
courts fashioned a profit remedy out of section 64(4)'s language requiring profit that
would have resulted from performance to be considered in the estimation of damages.
See, e.g., Popenberg v. R. M. Owen & Co., 84 Misc. 126, 146 N.Y. Supp. 478 (Sup. Ct.
1914), aff'd, 221 N.Y. 569, 116 N.E. 1070 (1917). Two other justifications that courts
advanced for abandoning the general difference money formula of section 64(3) to
find a profit remedy elsewhere were that the situation of lost-volume sellers constituted "special circumstances" within the meaning of section 64(3), or that there was
no "available market" for the goods. A. CORBIN, supra note 15, at 542 n.85; accord
Harris, supra note 5 at 84. Professor Harris found that those courts denying a recovery for lost profits under the Sales Act decided that the plaintiff had failed to prove
there was no "available market" and was, therefore, limited to a different money recovery under section 64(3). Id. It is unlikely, however, that market conditions were
really distinguishable in the cases where profits were awarded. Compare Charles St.
Garage Co. v. Kaplan, 312 Mass. 624, 45 N.E.2d 928 (1942) (no evidence auto dealer
couldn't sell at "market price" the original buyer had agreed to pay) with Popp v.
Yuenger, 229 Wis. 189, 212 N.W. 55 (1938) (court found that because 1938 models
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proved a lost profit formula,30 but only one cited lost-volume status
as a reason for doing so.3" In fact, Professor Robert Harris,3 2 a

U.C.C. pioneer who, in a series of articles contrasting Article Two's
provisions with those of the Uniform Sales Act, claimed that in the
only Sales Act case properly presenting the question of lost volume,
the court declined to award lost profits.3 3 Even in the paradigm lostvolume situation of new car dealers," several decisions under the
Sales Act rejected any kind of profit remedy.' Because of section
64's restrictive language,' the vast majority of lost profit cases
under the Sales Act involved three distinct profit situations unrewere available, there was no longer a market for 1937 models).
30. See supra note 29 for sales act cases permitting a profit remedy.
31. See Popp v. Yuenger, 229 Wis. 189, 282 N.W. 55 (1938) (measure of dealer's
loss on breach of automobile sales contract is difference between dealer cost and sum
of cash price and fair market value of trade-in). The Popp court cited Mason &
Risch, Ltd. v. Christner, 47 Ont. L.R. 52 (1920) (court awarded profit remedy for
breached car sale on basis of seller's lost volume).
32. See supra note 7 for a list of Professor Harris' writings in this field.
33. Harris, supra note 5, at 83, citing A. Lenobel, Inc. v. Senif, 252 A.D. 533,
300 N.Y.Supp. 226 (1937), modified, 253 A.D. 813, 1 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1938) (profit
remedy dependent upon complexities of car dealer's overhead denied because not in
contemplation of the parties). Harris, however, conceded that the Popp court, see
supra note 31, may have understood the argument. Harris, supra note 5, at 84.
34. Many of the early Sales Act cases awarding profit as a seller's remedy involved new car sales by dealers. See Torkomian v. Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 97 A. 760
(1916) (automobile agent liable for difference between contract price and what car
cost agent). Poppenberg v. R.M. Owen & Co., 84 Misc. 126, 146 N.Y. Supp. 478 (Sup.
Ct. 1914), aff'd, 221 N.Y. 569, 116 N.E. 1070 (1917) (in absence of special circumstances, measure of damages is profit seller would have made); Stewart v. Hansen, 62
Utah 281, 218 P. 959 (1923) (dealer could recover profits lost after buyer refused to
accept automobile); Commentators have therefore often used automobile dealers as a
pedagogical example of volume sellers. See W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6; see also Harris, supra note 5 at 94, n.141 (car dealer cases have provided most of the lost-volume
litigation). For a more recent decision awarding a car dealer his lost profit, see Kaiserman v. Martin J. Ain, Ltd., 112 Misc.2d 768, 450 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Term. 1983).
35. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. ex. rel. Keyser v. Fry, 203 Ill. App. 46 (1916)
(seller exercising option to retain sum provided in contract as liquidated damages
precluded from further recovery); Chalmers Motor Co. v. Maibaum, 186 Ill. App. 147
(1914) (recovery of profits erroneous in deceit action for procuring cancellation of
order); Charles St. Garage Co. v. Kaplan, 312 Mass. 624, 45 N.E.2d 928 (1942) (measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and market price rather
than profit); Babbitt v. Wides Motor Sales Corp., 17 Misc. 2d 889, 192 N.Y.S.2d 21
(App. Term 1959) (measure of damages for buyer's failure to accept automobile is
difference between contract price and market value); Genovese v. A. Lenobel, Inc.,
148 Misc. 548, 265 N.Y.S. 338 (Mun. Ct. 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 154 Misc. 91,
275 N.Y.S. 521 (App. Term 1934) (where there's an available market for type of automobile sold, measure of damages is difference between market and contract price);
Lowas Garage Co. v. Scheer, 199 N.Y. Supp. 748 (App. Term 1923) (automobile seller
not entitled to recover commissions lost on breached sale); Schuenemann v. John G.
Wollaeger Co., 170 Wis. 616, 176 N.W. 59 (1920) (upon buyer's breach, seller may
hold property for buyer and recover difference between contract price and fair market value).
36. There is no express authorization in the Sales Act to justify a profit remedy
for volume sellers. See supra note 28 for the text of section 64 of the Uniform Sales
Act.
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lated to the lost-volume seller: (1) profit as an alternative remedy
where there is no available resale market;3 7 (2) profit as an appropriate damages formula for components sellers;38 and (3) lost profits as
consequential damages.3 9
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

2-708(2)

It was against this background of common law and Sales Act
cases that the drafters of Article Two created a truly innovative
damages provision:
Seller's Damages for Non-acceptance or Repudiation
*.. (2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) [con-

tract price less market price] is inadequate to put the seller in as good
a position as performance would have done then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller
would have made from full performance by the buyer, together with
any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due
allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments
or proceeds of resale.40
Unfortunately, this Code section was drafted in stages-the early
drafts were designed to address the lost-volume seller,4 with the
37. In three cases, the court found a profit remedy appropriate because there
was no available resale market. Smead v. Sutherland, 118 Vt. 361, 111 A.2d 335
(1955); Breding v. Champlain Marine & Realty Co., 106 Vt. 288, 172 At. 625 (1934);
Popp v. Yuenger, 229 Wis. 189, 282 N.W. 55 (1938). Other courts, however, denied a
profit remedy because the seller failed to prove there was no available resale market.
Charles St. Garage Co. v. Kaplan, 312 Mass. 624, 45 N.E.2d 928 (1942); Genovese v.
A. Lenobel, Inc., 148 Misc. 548, 265 N.Y.S. 338 (Mun. Ct. 1933), rev'd on other
grounds, 154 Misc. 91, 275 N.Y.S. 521 (App. Term. 1934); Lowas Garage Co. v.
Scheer, 199 N.Y.S. 748 (App. Term 1923). Professor Harris said the decisions finding
no available market were "wholly arbitrary" and were made without any effort to
define "available market."
38. The component seller is not really given a profit remedy. Where the buyer
repudiates before the goods have been completed, the seller recovers the unpaid balance of the contract price less costs saved. This recovery may equal "gross profit" on
a sale but only because the defendant-buyer has not prepaid anything. See Miami
Cycle & Mfg. Co. v. National Carbon Co., 268 F. 46 (6th Cir. 1920); Snelling v. Dine,
270 Mass. 501, 170 N.E. 403 (1930); Hilltop Sand Corp. v. Simpson, 225 A.D. 467, 233
N.Y.S. 348 (1929); Nelson Equip. Co. v. Harner, 191 Or. 359, 230 P.2d 188 (1951);
Stevenson v. Puget Sound Vegetable Growers Ass'n, 172 Wash. 196, 19 P.2d 925
(1933):
39. This is, of course, the problem of the classic contracts case, Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Profit as consequential damages is a
remedy of plaintiff-buyers for losses on a larger transaction which were caused by the
breach of this contract. The second rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is that a buyer's
consequential damages for a seller's breach are limited to those losses reasonably
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, at 873-74.
40. U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
41. Section 2-708 first appeared in one unified section as section 110 of Proposed Final Draft No. 1 of the Uniform Revised Sales Act (1944). As originally written, the section simply provided that where the money difference formula is "inade-
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drafters later haphazardly adding language to address the components seller.4 2 If read literally, the language of the section which
grants lost profit damages to components sellers also effectively denies the same damages to lost-volume sellers.4" This is odd, however,
because to provide lost-volume sellers with a profit remedy was
clearly a major goal of section 2-708(2)'s drafters." A further complication appears in Official Comment 2 to section 2-708(2), which
quate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done, then
the measure of damages is the profit the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer." (emphasis added). Id. This section's use of the bare term "profit"
made it arguable that such an alternative remedy was available to the assembler
(buyer breaches before assembler-seller has the raw goods), the manufacturer (buyer
breaches when manufacture partially completed), and the lost-volume dealer (retailers with unlimited access to inventory). See Harris, supra note 5, at 97.
When this language became section 2-708 of the 1949 draft of the U.C.C., the
official comments made it clear that the profit remedy was at least available to volume dealers, being "designed to eliminate the unfair and economically wasteful resuits arising under the older law when fixed-priced articles were involved. This section permits the recovery of lost profits in all appropriate cases which would include
all standard-priced goods." 1949 Draft of the U.C.C., § 2-708, comment 2.
The resulting statutory muddle remains a quagmire today. On the one hand, the
text of section 2-708(2) makes it clear that manufacturers of partially completed
goods are to enjoy a profit remedy. On the other hand, comment 2 makes it quite
clear that the drafters also intended that lost-volume dealers be awarded their expected profit. Because the official comments are just that-comments, some legislatures adopting the Code's text did not simultaneously adopt the U.C.C.'s official comments. Therefore, one may forcefully argue in these jurisdictions that appending the
old "fixed-price" comments to the "manufacturers-oriented" text was an error, and
that the plain language of the statute simply precludes a profit remedy for the volume dealer. See Shanker, The Case for a Literal Reading of U.C.C. Section 2-708(2)
(One Profit for the Reseller), 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 697 (1973).
In 1950, the parenthetical phrase "(including reasonable overhead)" was added
to the text. Supplement No. 1 to the 1951 Official Draft. The New York Law Revision
Commission tentatively suggested that the language of section 2-708 "would, or at
least might," expand the profit test (contract price less cost of procurement) to cases
of dealers in fixed-price articles (previous New York cases only applied the profit
formula to manufacturer-sellers). N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM., 1 STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 1955 REPORT 643, 695 (reprint ed. 1980). The Commission also
believed that a profit remedy for dealers was majority law. Id. at 361. The case law,
however, does not support this statement. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying
text.
42. In 1955, the U.C.C. Editorial Board added some qualifying language to the
section 2-708(2) profit formula, specifically requiring "due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for any resale." Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official
Draft (1955). The Board's stated reason for the change was "to clarify the privilege of
the seller to realize junk value when it is manifestly useless to complete the operation
of manufacture." Id.
43. There was now no doubt that the profit formula of 2-708 was applicable to
manufacturers of partially completed goods, but it no longer worked for dealers of
completed goods. To illustrate, assume a car with a dealer cost of $7,000 and a retail
sticker price of $10,000. If the buyer repudiates his contract, a "profit" remedy should
give the dealer $3,000 in damages. Assume now that the dealer is able to resell the car
to another customer for the same $10,000 price. If "due credit for any resale" must be
given to the breaching buyer, the dealer is left with only his "costs reasonably incurred" (incidental damages) and the result is no different than under section 2-706.
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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indicates that profit damages should be available in "all appropriate
' This comment
cases, including all sales of standard-priced goods."45
is dangerously misleading at best because whether goods are "standard-priced" bears no relation to whether the damages formula of 2708(1) is inadequate, or to whether the seller has lost any volume."
These problems of statutory construction have led one commentator

7

and a few courts' 8 to conclude that profits are simply not

available as a remedy for the lost-volume seller under section 2708(2).4" Nevertheless, even though one has to ignore the plain language of the section to find such a remedy, the vast majority of
courts considering the question have been willing to do just that."0
45.

The 1956 U.C.C. Editorial Board recommendations created a separate sub-

section for the profit formula, but issued it without comments. It therefore appeared
as though dealers were now cut out of the profit remedy-although whether this was
by design or unintentional omission is unclear. The comments added to the Official
1957 Text, however, were those of the 1952-53 Drafts and focused on the case of
fixed-price articles (lost volume dealers).
46. For example, assume a car dealer, D, who has fifty 1989 model cars on his
lot. It is the end of the model year and he can get no more 1989s from the manufacturer. If D sells all fifty cars at a standard price of $7500 but there are at least fiftyone willing buyers at that price, a repudiation by one buyer will mean only that the
breached sale will be replaced by buyer number fifty-one. Although the cars are
"standard-priced" goods, there is clearly no lost volume-D could sell only fifty cars
whether or not there was a breach. The contract price-market price differential
formula of section 2-708(1) is therefore clearly adequate to put D in as good a position as buyer's performance would have-D had 50 sales and 50 profits. See, e.g., J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 316 (when demand for cars exceeded available
supply after World War II, most dealers lost nothing when a buyer breached). Similarly, even where the price of the good is not fixed (perhaps it fluctuates in a volatile
market), if a breach by the buyer results in one less sale, the dealer has lost a profit
and the money difference formula in section 2-708(1) will be "inadequate."
47. See Shanker, supra note 41, at 700.
48. See R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987)
(district court held "lost volume dealers" limited to section 2-706 recovery); Neri v.
Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1972) (trial court found
boat dealer's claim for loss of profit "untenable").
49. Given the amount of violence one has to do to the plain language of the
statute in order to derive a profit remedy for the volume seller, it is surprising that no
decision denying the applicability of section 2-708(2) to volume sellers has been upheld on appeal.
50. See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. dismissed, 476 U.S. 1139 (1986) (applying Washington law to sale of aircraft spare parts); Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d 865 (1st Cir.
1982) (applying Massachusetts law to sale of transistor test system); TCP Indus., Inc.
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1981); Unique Sys., Inc. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc.,
622 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Minnesota law to sale of hair spray systems);
Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying
Virginia law to sale of sweaters); Great W. Sugar Co. v. Mrs. Alison's Cookie Co., 563
F. Supp 430 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 516 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying Missouri
law to sale of sugar); Comeq, Inc. v. Mitternight Boiler Works, Inc., 456 So.2d 264
(Ala. 1984) (industrial machine); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus., Inc., 144 Ariz.
181, 696 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. App. 1984) (control systems); Capital Steel Co. v. Foster &
Creighton Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574 S.W.2d 256 (1978) (steel); Distribu-Dor, Inc. v.
Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1970) (shower doors); Snyder v.
Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618 (1977) (carpet);
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in the
recent case of R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc.,51 was
only the latest court to reach this conclusion.
III.

DEFINING THE LOST-VOLUME SELLER

The Code itself provides no help in defining who is a lost-volume seller. 2 The official text states only that profit is an allowable
measure of damages if the 2-708(1) formula is "inadequate to put
the seller in as good a position as performance would have."53 As
already noted, the official comment cryptically states that the profit
remedy is available "in all appropriate cases,""' which would include
"all standard-priced goods."55 However, because neither the section's text nor its. comments provide any substantive guidance on
what are appropriate cases, courts and commentators are left to interpret the statutory language" by reviewing the legislative history,5 7 applying rules of statutory construction," and referring to
supplementary common law principles.59
Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972) (boat); Lake
Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 463 N.E.2d 70 (1983) (boat).
51. 826 F.2d 678 (1987). See infra notes 60-70 for a discussion of the Davis case.
52. Because the expression "lost-volume seller" does not even appear in the text
of 2-708, it should not be surprising that the Code offers no definitional clues. Although the official text does not expressly state it, this comment assumes that it was
the lost-volume concept in Sales Act and common law and cases that led the drafters
of Article 2 to provide a profit remedy for sellers of "standard-priced goods." See
supra notes 40-50.
53. U.C.C. § 2-708(2). This phrase is a direct reference to the general damage
philosophy of the Code:
(1) The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of
law.
U.C.C. § 1-106.
54. Presumably, "appropriate cases" are those in which the money-difference
formula of 2-708(1) is "inadequate."
55. See supra notes 45-46 for the history of this curious and misleading phrase.
56. The relevant language from section 2-708(2) is "inadequate to put the seller
in as good a position as performance would have."
57. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the peculiar legislative history of section 2-708.
58. Rules of construction can be found both within the Code, see § 1-102 (Code
to be liberally construed to promote underlying purposes; limitations to freedom of
contract acknowledged), and outside the Code, see, e.g., D. SANDS, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

(4th ed. 1972). In addition, common law principles of stat-

utory construction are applicable when not displaced by the rules of construction in
section 1-102. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
59. Section 1-103 provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall sup-
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In Davis, s a purchaser of diagnostic medical equipment repudiated its contract and sued the manufacturer-seller for the return of
its $300,000 downpayment.dl The seller counterclaimed, arguing that
as a lost-volume seller, he was entitled to an offset equal to his lost
profit on the breached sale, notwithstanding the fact that he subsequently resold the equipment for the same price.62 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the breaching buyer." On
appeal, the seventh circuit noted, with some surprise, that the availability of lost profit damages for a volume seller was an issue of first
impression under Illinois law.64 The court reversed,65 holding that
lost-volume sellers are entitled to recover profits under section 2708(2).6" The court, however, remanded the case to the trial court
for a determination of whether the manufacturer qualified as a lostvolume seller. 67 The court specifically held that the seller has the
burden of proving (1) that it had the capacity to produce units for
both the breaching buyer and the subsequent resale purchaser; 8 (2)
that it would have been profitable to have "produced and sold" both
units; 6 and, (3) that it would have made the second sale absent the
plement it provisions.

U.C.C. § 1-103. Therefore, if the text, comments, legislative history and rules of construction are inadequate guides in ascertaining the correct interpretation of a particular Code section, courts should not hesitate to examine other case law, both pre-Code
and post-Code, under both the Sales Act and the general common law, to illuminate
the meaning of a particular Code passage. See Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 N.W.U. L. REV. 906
(1978).
60. R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987).
61. Id. at 680. The buyer asked for restitution under U.C.C. § 2-718(2) (ILL.
REV. STAT., ch. 26, 1 2-718(2) (1985)).
62. Davis, 826 F.2d at 680.
63. Id. The district court held that where a seller has resold the goods in a
commercially reasonable manner, he is limited to a section 2-706(1) recovery of the
difference between the contract price and the resale price. Diasonics had resold the
goods that Davis refused to accept, id. at 682, so it could not recover under 2-708. Id.
at 680.
64. Id. at 681. Because no Illinois court had previously addressed the question,
the Seventh Circuit had to predict how the Illinois Supreme Court would rule on the
availability of a profit remedy for the volume seller. Id. But see Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Decker Coal Co., 653 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (cases and
statutory language indicate section 2-708 remedies available only when primary remedy under section 2-706 is unavailable).
65. Davis, 826 F.2d at 679.
66. Id. at 681. The court first determined that the plaintiff who resells can jump
from section 2-706 to 2-708 because the Code's remedies are "cumulative in nature,"
id. at 683 (citing U.C.C. § 2-703, comment 1), and were intended to destroy the common law doctrine of election of remedies. Id. The court also concluded that where the
buyer's breach causes a loss of sales volume, a section 2-708(1) measure of damages
may not put the seller in as good a position as performance would have. Id. at 684.
67. Id. at 685. In February of 1989, the parties were still waiting to receive a
date for retrial in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
68. Id.
69. Id. See infra note 72 for an explanation of the Davis court's error in including profitability as an element of its lost-volume seller definition.
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breach.7 0

The Davis court's definition of lost-volume seller is the classic
definition first articulated by Professor Harris"' in 1964, with an additional element added to reflect recent microeconomic criticism of
the original test.72 Harris' definition of the lost-volume seller, therefore, is an obvious starting point: "Resale results in loss of volume
only if three conditions are met: (1) the person who bought the resold entity would have been solicited by plaintiff had there been no
breach and resale; (2) the solicitation would have been successful;
and, (3) the plaintiff could have performed that additional
73
contract."
This definition was the standard for nearly a decade because
the lost-volume problem was virtually unlitigated for several years
after the 1962 Official Text of the U.C.C. was issued. 4 In the early
1970s, however, several commentators began to attack the economic
assumptions that support a profit remedy for the lost-volume
seller. 5 The thrust of their argument was twofold. First, they
70. Id. The court placed this burden on the seller because the party claiming
injury always bears the burden of establishing its damages. Finance Am. Commercial
Corp. v. Econo Coach, Inc., 118 Ill. App. 3d 385, 390, 454 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (1983).
71. Professor Harris did much of the initial investigative groundwork into sellers' U.C.C. remedies in a series of articles published shortly after the 1962 Official
Text was issued. See infra text accompanying note 73 for an explanation of Professor
Harris' test for lost-volume seller status. See supra note 7 for a list of Professor Harris' U.C.C. articles.
72. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of
microeconomic analysis of the lost volume problem. The Davis court noted the economic criticism of the lost volume profit remedy and therefore took exception with
the definitions of lost volume sellers that other courts had adopted. "In reality, however, the relevant questions include not only whether the seller had the capacity to
produce the breached units in addition to its actual volume, but also whether it
would have been profitable for the seller to produce both units." Davis, 826 F.2d at
684 (citing Goetz & Scott, Measuring Seller's Damages: The Lost Profits Puzzle, 31
STAN. L. REv. 323, 332-33, 346-47 (1979)). However, the court here has muddied the
waters by confusing the issue of lost-volume seller status with the issue of damages.
Under this comment's proposal, a seller may clearly establish that he has lost a sale,
yet fail to establish his damages with reasonable certainty. See notes 93-135 and accompanying text for an explanation of the author's proposed test for lost-volume
seller status. Whether a particular remedy is available to a given plaintiff is a question quite distinct from whether he will be able to prove his loss under the statute
providing the remedy.
73. Harris, supra note 5, at 82. The Davis court collapsed the first two elements
of Professor Harris' test, see supra text accompanying notes 68-70, into its own third
element (resale would have been made even absent the breach).
74. The first lost-volume cases did not appear until the late 1960s. Vitex Mfg.
Corp., Ltd. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967) (Code not controlling in
Virgin Islands, but court applied it because it embodies foremost modern legal
thought). Other early cases include Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d
463, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1970); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d
311 (1972).
75. See Goetz & Scott, Measuring Seller's Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle,
31 STAN. L. REv. 323 (1979); Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovery of Overhead Under
U.C.C. Section 2-708(2): Economic Cost Theory and Contract Remedy Policy, 57
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claimed that due to the law of diminishing marginal returns on additional production,7 6 many profit-maximizing firms would choose
not to produce the additional units necessary to satisfy the additional marginal buyer who was "lost" due to the original buyer's
breach. 7 Second, these critics argued that unless there are no willing buyers at any reduced price, the seller has not really lost any
volume and the remedy provided by section 2-706 (contract priceresale price differential), is completely adequate to fully compensate
the aggrieved seller. 8
While the former criticism is undoubtedly correct on a theoretical level, it is doubtful whether many real-world firms fit the "profit9
7
maximizing" model hypothesized by the micro-economic critics. It

seems more likely that most firms are less than perfectly efficient,
that their marginal revenue will exceed their marginal costs, and
that they would choose to produce the additional units necessary to
satisfy the additional lost sale.The latter criticism is irrelevant as a
CORNELL L. REv. 681 (1972); Note, A Theoretical Postscript-Microeconomicsand

the Lost-Volume Seller, 24
YSiS OF LAW

CASE

W. RES. L. REv. 712 (1973); see also ECONOMIC ANAL-

59 n.7 (1972).

76. Marginal cost is the cost incurred to produce one additional unit of output.
P. SAMUELSON, ECONoMics 450-51 (9th ed. 1973). The theory of diminishing marginal
returns is that many firms are operating at such an efficient level of production that
increasing production for that extra lost-volume unit might actually be unprofitable
because the resulting increase in supply may cause the market price to fall to an
overall extent greater than the gross profit on the additional sale. Sebert, supra note
4, at 390.
77. If given a choice, a seller in such an efficient market of diminishing returns
may actually have decided not to produce the additional goods if the original buyer
had not breached. Id. In such a scenario, the manufacturer-seller has clearly not lost
any volume-he would have made the same number of sales whether or not there had
been a breach by the original buyer.
78. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 75. The theory here is that a subsequent
resale at any price gives the aggrieved seller the benefit of his bargain on one sale;
damages under section 2-706, measured by the difference between the original contract price and the resale price, give him the benefit of his bargain on the original
sale. Id. at 328-29. Thus, the seller has the benefit of two sales and, therefore, has lost
no volume.
79. As Professor Sebert indicates, the microeconomic critique is based on a series of questionable assumptions: "(1) that marginal costs are rising such that the
production of additional goods for sale to buyer 2 will cause marginal costs to exceed
marginal revenue; (2) that the seller knows this fact, and (3) that the seller will act
rationally by not making an additional sale to buyer 2." Sebert, supra note 4, at 390.
These assumptions are unrealistic in several respects. First, because marginal costs
are generally quite constant within considerable variations of output, it is the abnormal additional sale in which the marginal cost would exceed the marginal revenue. Id.
Second, unless the seller has incredibly sensitive accounting procedures, he is unlikely
to discover that the marginal sale would be unprofitable. Id. at 391. Third, Professor
Sebert suggests that most business people would be inclined to make as many sales as
their capacity will permit. Id. It is even quite possible that full-capacity manufacturers lose volume on a breached sale of standard-manufacture goods, because most such
manufacturers have a backlog of orders which will, at some future time, be filled in
turn; thus, even the most fundamental premise of the microeconomic critique, that
full-capacity manufacturers cannot be lost-volume sellers, is suspect.
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matter of statutory construction because the profit remedy is an alternative to the damages formula under section 2-708(1),8o not to
the formula under 2-706(1)." 1 The importance of the micro-economic
critique is not that it helps prove whether the lost or replacement
sale would be profitable,"' but that it might indicate whether the
seller would actually make the second sale.8s Even if the seller would
profit from another sale, if the profit was so minimal that the seller
would have chosen not to make the sale, he has not lost any
volume.84
Professor John Sebert added immeasurably to the lost-volume
discussion with an article published in 1981.85 He observed that
many courts have focused unduly on the seller's capacity to supply
all probable buyers in determining whether that seller qualified as a
lost-volume seller.88 In effect, those courts have not applied the sec80. The seller's right to a profit remedy is conditioned on the inadequacy of the
section 2-708(1) formula "to put the seller in as good a position as performance would
have." U.C.C. § 2-708(2). See supra text accompanying note 40 for the full text of 2708(2).
81. As to the reselling seller's ability to reject the section 2-706 damage formula
(contract price less resale price), and jump to section 2-708, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 309-13. The district court in Davis did, however, hold that § 2708 was available only where 2-706 and 2-709 damages (seller's primary remedies)
were inapplicable. R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678, 682 (7th
Cir. 1987). Although the seventh circuit rejected this view of the Code's sellers remedies, see supra note 66, the language of several remedy sections and accompanying
comments are reasonably capable of such a construction. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-704,
comment 1 (2-706 is the "primary" remedy for seller); § 2-706, comment 2 (seller
"relegated" to 2-708 if he fails to act properly under 2-706); § 2-709(2) (if seller not
entitled to price, damages for non-acceptance under 2-708 are available); § 2-709,
comment 7 (to same effect).
82. Proving whether the lost sale would be profitable is not properly an element
of any lost-volume test. It is merely a necessary element of proof for any plaintiffseller's damage claim. In theory, one should be able to demonstrate his status as a
lost volume seller and still fail to recover due to inadequate proof of damages, i.e.,
profit. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text for the proper measure of damages for the lost-volume seller.
83. See infra notes 110-29 and accompanying text, which argue that determining whether both sales (original breached sale and subsequent replacement sale),
would have been made is the key question in most contested lost-volume cases.
84. Assume that a manufacturer of jumbo jets, in order to fill the additional
order represented by the breached sale, must hire another shift of workers at a considerable cost; if he knows this will reduce his gross profit on the next $5,000,000 sale
to a mere $2500, it is unlikely he will expand his workforce to supply the additional
buyer (unless he knows he can maintain the additional output in the future). Would
the additional "lost" sale be profitable, then? Yes. Has the manufacturer really lost
any volume, though? Clearly, he has not.
85. Professor Sebert's article Remedies Under Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code: An Agenda for Review, supra note 4, at 386-93, is the best available synthesis of the lost-volume debate.
86. Id. at 387-88. See, e.g., Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d
251 (4th Cir. 1974) (existing stock available); Great Western Sugar Co. v. Mrs. Alison's Cookie Co., 563 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 749 F.2d
516 (8th Cir. 1984) (supply exceeds demand); Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI By.
v. Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1289
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ond element of Professor Harris' lost volume test."7 Even where a
seller's supply greatly exceeds market demand, he loses no volume if
he cannot meet the needs of both the particular resale buyer and the
original buyer."8 In order to ensure that courts do not overcompensate sellers by bestowing undeserving lost-volume status on them, "
courts must do more than simply reemphasize the other two elements of Professor Harris' test.9 0 The trier of fact must be made
more aware of the many sub-elements which make up each of the
test factors" and, perhaps, be given a more workable framework of
analysis with which to make this decision. 2
IV.

LoST-VOLUME SELLERS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Lost-volume seller status is a question of fact." Therefore, a series of guidelines are needed for the trier of fact to determine, under
the circumstances of the particular case, whether a particular seller
(2d Cir. 1979) (sufficient production capacity); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus.,
Inc., 144 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. App. 1984) (capacity to supply all customers
and the breaching buyer); Kaiserman v. Martin J. Ain, Ltd., 112 Misc. 2d 768, 450
N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Term. 1981) (all retail dealers-who presumably have an inexhaustible supply of goods); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 30 N.Y.2d
393 (1972) (unlimited supply of standard-priced goods). Several commentators have
run afoul of the same trap. See, e.g., Childres & Burgess, supra note 4, at 880-81, 886
(lost volume depends on whether seller has unlimited supply of goods); 2 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, § 2-708:04 (unlimited supply); R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, § 2708:21 (dealers entitled to lost profits).
87. Sebert, supra note 4, at 389, n.120. The Harris test's second element states
that an attempted resale solicitation was or would have been successful. See supra
text accompanying note 73 for the elements of the Harris test for lost volume status.
88. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text for an explanation of why the
needs of a given resale buyer may determine whether the seller has actually lost any
volume.
89. Several courts have recited the Harris test, yet reached incorrect results by
ignoring one or more of its elements. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co, 771
F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 476 U.S. 1139 (1986) (lost profits awarded
for breach of contract for sale of spare aircraft parts although large excess inventory
for customer would likely be resold only by special solicitation efforts); TCP Indus.,
Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1981) (award of lost profits upheld even
though middleman-seller contractually able to sell only to breaching buyer). But see
Malone v. Carl Kisabeth Co., Inc., 726 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App. 1987) (court correctly
held there was disputed question as to whether seller of chairs had lost volume where
seller testified that resale "could not have been made" if chairs had not been in showroom after original buyer breached); Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d
722 (Me. 1983) (correctly holding that mobile home seller could not claim lost-volume
seller status because most likely resale buyer was father of original breaching buyer).
90. The general damage philosophy of the Code is that aggrieved parties should
be put in as good an economic position as (but not better than) performance of the
contract would have put them in. U.C.C. § 1-106 (Code remedies not punitive).
91. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Harris
test's first two elements.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 93-104 outlining the author's proposal
for a two-pronged test to determine lost-volume seller status.
93. R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678, 684-85 (7th Cir.
1987); Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1974).
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has proven he is a lost-volume seller. Courts must answer two overarching questions to determine if the plaintiff-seller is also a lostvolume seller. If the trier of fact can answer both questions affirmatively, then the seller has lost volume and should be entitled to the
profit lost on one sale.
The first question is whether the seller can make both sales.
This comment will call this inquiry the "capacity question."' 4 To
answer this question, one need only look at the seller's ability to
supply the additional lost buyer represented by the repudiated
sale.' 5 The capacity question does not require courts to scrutinize
the peculiar characteristics of either the breached sale or the replacement sale. They need only find that the seller had the ability"
to make both sales. This is the branch of the lost profit inquiry on
which so many courts have fixated.' The second question is whether
the original sale and the post-breach resale are wholly independent
events, with the latter sale likely occurring regardless of whether
there was a breach.' Where the two sales are "wholly independent"
events, the seller has suffered lost volume and a profit award is an
appropriate damage remedy under section 2-708(2)." This second
inquiry will determine the question of lost-volume seller status more
often than the capacity question.100 However, by not looking closely
enough at this second question, courts have inappropriately awarded
lost profits to many sellers who most likely did not suffer any lost
volume. 10 1 This is a disturbing result because it indicates that the
94. See infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the capacity question. This is the third element of the Harris test. See supra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text for the microeconomic critique of a profit for so-called "volume"
sellers.
95. The seller, under this branch of the inquiry is therefore isolated without
reference to either the original or resale purchasers.
96. The capacity question might be rephrased as "could the seller have supplied
two buyers?"
97. Frequently the "analysis" of such courts involves nothing more than the
bald statement that the seller is entitled to a profit remedy because he can supply all
obtainable customers. See supra note 86 for cases in which the capacity issue was
apparently dispositive on the question of lost-volume seller status.
98. See infra notes 110-29 and accompanying text for a three-part test to determine when there are two "wholly independent sales events."
99. A profit remedy is "appropriate" because it is necessary to put the aggrieved seller "in as good a position as performance" of the contract would have.
U.C.C. §§ 1-106, 2-708(2).
100. This is true simply because most retail dealers have access to additional
replacement stock and most manufacturers are operating at less than 100% of capacity. See infra note 108 for cases where the capacity issue rightly was, or should have
been, dispositive on the issue of lost-volume status.
101. In each of the following cases, the facts clearly indicated that the resale
was not a wholly independent sales event from the original, breached sale: TCP Indus., Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1980) (middleman's contract with
petrochemical producer permitted sales only to the breaching third-party buyer); Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1970) (mirrored
shower doors recut and re-edged for ultimate resale purchaser); Autonumerics, Inc. v.
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section 2-708(1) remedy was entirely adequate,' that the court has
given the seller an unjustified double profit, 10 and that the general
damage philosophy of the entire U.C.C. has been thwarted.0 4 This
comment therefore suggests a method that courts can employ to

more accurately make a decision on the seller's lost volume status.
A.

The Capacity Question

A single question illustrates the capacity branch of this comment's lost-volume test: Could the seller have supplied both the
original and the resale buyer? On one level, clearly any seller can
supply additional buyers. For example, if the seller is a retailer and
he cannot get any more widgets from his producer, he could go into
widget production himself. Alternatively, if the seller is a manufacturer operating at full capacity, he could build a plant addition and
hire more workers to satisfy the additional buyer's demand for ten
extra widgets. This capacity question, however, focuses not on a theoretical ability to supply but rather on a practical ability to supply
both buyers.' 0 '
If a seller can show he had present excess manufacturing capacity or present ready access to additional inventory at the time of the
Bayer Indus., Inc., 144 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. App. 1984) (custom-built control systems altered to needs of resale buyer).
102. The inadequacy of the section 2-708(1) contract price-market price difference formula is a condition precedent to availability of a profit remedy under section
2-708(2). See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
103. The central justification of a profit remedy for lost volume sellers is that
such a seller deserves the benefit of both the bargains that he made independently of
one another. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 315; see also U.C.C. § 2-703
(damages are compensatory in nature and, to that effect, are to be liberally administered). If, however, the seller has not in fact lost a sale, he is entitled to only one
profit (the one he earned on resale of the wrongfully rejected goods).
104. U.C.C. § 1-106. See supra note 53 for the full text of this section.
105. The capacity inquiry, then, focuses on whether a retailer or manufacturer
could satisfy both buyers without extraordinary or unusual efforts. Usage of trade,
U.C.C. § 1-205(4), and the seller's past behavior would, of course, be relevant here.
Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 463 N.E.2d 70 (1983) is
illustrative. The court denied a retail boat dealer a lost profit remedy because the
only proof of the seller's capacity that was offered was testimony by the dealer's
salesman that "to his knowledge," the plaintiff-dealer had an unlimited supply of the
same boat that the defendant had purchased. Id. at 59, 463 N.E.2d at 73. The court
contrasted this with the evidence in an unreported boat dealer case:
The record ... shows that plaintiff has been in business for twenty years as a
company engaged in the retail sale of boats, motors, outboard motors, trailers,
[etc.] . .. Plaintiff sold approximately 300 boats in 1978 and 1979 with sales
totaling $1,700,000 in 1978 and about $2 million in 1979. Plaintiffs president
testified that plaintiff is a franchised dealer of Bayliner Marine Corporation
products and Bayliner has never refused to deliver any of plaintiff's orders ...
This uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to establish plaintiff as a volume
dealer.
Id. at 59, 463 N.E.2d at 72-73 (quoting Modern Marine, Inc. v. Balski, No. 43411
(Cuyahoga App. May 21, 1981).
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repudiation or non-acceptance, he has made a prima facie case on
the issue of capacity. 0 6 The burden then shifts to the breaching
buyer to show that the seller-manufacturer would not have utilized
his excess capacity for the extra widget production, or that although
the seller had access to extra stock, the seller-retailer would not normally restock. 7 If, however, the seller cannot show excess capacity
or ready access to additional replacement inventory, he should have
the burden of coming forward with convincing evidence that he
would, in fact, have expanded his manufacturing operations, or
sought and found replacement stock outside his regular supply
channels." 8 If the seller does offer such credible evidence, a question
of fact on the capacity issue remains.'0 0
106. The seller must carry the burden of proving his lost-volume seller status
because section 2-708(2) affords him a profit remedy only upon a showing that section
2-708(1) damages are inadequate. Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc. 38
Md. App. 144, 153, 380 A.2d 618, 627 (1977). However, because the majority of sellers, whether dealers or manufacturers, are probably lost-volume sellers, see supra
note 131 and accompanying text, this initial burden is appropriately light. But see
Goetz & Scott, supra note 75, at 329, 348-52 (in a world of efficient profit maximizing
firms, it may be presumed that most resale purchases merely replace the original
breached sale). However, as suggested earlier, see supra note 79 and accompanying
text, it is doubtful whether many firms either fit the ideal profit-maximizing model or
act consistent with the model if they do fit it.
107. In one section 2-708(2) case, a drug store company breached its contract to
buy a large number of sweaters from a wholesaler who resold the refused goods and
then sued the drug store, claiming lost-volume status. Famous Knitwear Corp. v.
Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1974). The drug store company defended by
arguing that the wholesaler lost no volume because (1) but for the drug store's large
order, the wholesaler would not have had sweaters on hand for the ultimate resale
purchaser, and (2) it was sufficiently late in the winter season that the wholesaler
would not have restocked sweaters to meet any alleged lost-volume demand. Id. at
254.
108. In a number of cases, the capacity question was, or should have been determinative. In one, the sixth circuit erroneously held that a wholesale supplier of
petrochemicals was entitled to a profit remedy after the buyer in an exclusive dealing
contract refused delivery. TCP Indus., Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.
1981). In fact, however, the middleman could not actually have lost a profit as a result of the repudiated sale; the wholesaler's contract with his producer permitted
sales to only one company. Id. at 547. Therefore, the wholesale seller simply did not
have the legal ability, or "capacity," to make a second sale in addition to the sale
breached by the original buyer. Nonetheless, the court inexplicably concluded that
the issue of lost-volume seller status was "a close one" and, consequently, it was not
fundamental error for the trial court to give a lost profit instruction. Id.
In Lake Erie Boat Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 11 Ohio App. 3d 55, 463 N.E. 2d 70
(1983), the court correctly held that testimony by a boat retailer's salesman that "to
his knowledge," the dealer had an unlimited supply of similar boats, was insufficient
to establish that the seller had the "ability" to perform the additional contract lost
by defendant's repudiation. Id. at 59, 463 N.E.2d at 73.
109. Lost-volume seller status is a question of proof. Sebert, supra note 4, at
391. See supra note 93 for authorities holding that lost-volume seller status is a question of fact.
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Resale as a Wholly Independent Event

A single question also illustrates the inquiry behind the second
branch of this comment's lost-volume test: Would the plaintiffseller have made a sale to the ultimate resale purchaser even if
there had been no repudiationby the original buyer of the goods?11 °
This comment has observed that unless the original sale and the resale after breach are wholly independent events, there is probably
no lost volume and a profit award would constitute an impermissible
double recovery for the seller."' It is on this branch of the lost volume inquiry that most courts have stumbled-if they have addressed it at all.11 2 The first two elements in Professor Harris' definition of lost-volume sellers address this concern, but not in
sufficient detail to be useful."' Furthermore, he does not isolate all
the factors that could contribute to a finding that a given resale was
a wholly independent event from the original sale 4 and, consequently, whether a given seller has or has not lost any volume.
The three relevant variables involved in a post-breach resale are
the seller, the buyer, and the particular goods sold. Only by carefully
examining the characteristics of each variable, with a view toward
the peculiar facts of the case, can a trier of fact hope to accurately
make the rather complicated determination that the resale was a
wholly independent event from the original sale.

110. This might also be termed a causation element. That is, the question is
whether the second sale [represented by the resale purchase], was caused by the original buyer's repudiation. See infra note 117 for a case that recognized a causal, or
dependent, relationship must exist between the original sale and the subsequent resale to defeat a lost volume seller's claim for profit.
111. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text for the framework of this
argument.
112. See supra note 86 for decisions in which the court focused almost exclusively on the capacity question. Some courts, however, have looked beyond the capacity question and managed to reach correct results. See, e.g., Schiavi Mobile Homes,
Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722 (Me. 1983) (no lost volume where father of original
buyer offered to complete payments on the son's contract).
113. See supra text accompanying note 73 for the Harris lost-volume seller test.
The first condition precedent to lost-volume seller status under the Harris test (the
resale buyer would have been solicited by the seller even had there been no breach) is
actually misleading because probable solicitation, alone, is irrelevant. If the resale
purchaser would have placed an order with, or bought off the shelf from, the seller in
any event, the original buyer's repudiation has cost the seller a profit, irrespective of
the fact that he makes no "solicitation" of the resale purchaser.
114. Professor Harris' test does not recognize that the characteristics of the particular goods resold may be probative of whether a resale is a wholly independent
event from the original sale. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text for this
comment's argument that the nature of the goods is relevant in deciding this
question.
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1. The Seller
The seller claiming lost-volume status will attempt to show that
regardless of whether a breach had occurred on the original sale, he
would have made a sale to the ultimate resale purchaser." 5 In other
words, the breach of the original sale did not provide the opportunity to make the resale; therefore, the resale is not a replacement
sale,11 the price of which would offset the seller's damages. Instead,
the resale is a distinctly separate transaction.1 7 In such a case, once
the buyer breaches, the opportunity to make the original sale is irretrievably lost.118 Clearly, the injury to the seller is the profit he
would have made on that one sale. 9
115. The seller argues that he has done nothing to link the original sale and the
resale purchase in a chain of causation. Harris makes the question too narrow by
asking whether the seller would have solicited the ultimate resale purchaser. See
supra note 113.
116. See A. CORBIN, supra note 15, at 541-42.
117. The resale is a "wholly independent sales event." Only one court's treatment of the lost volume question indicates a clear understanding of this principle. In
Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 38 Md. App. 144, 380 A.2d 618 (1977), a
seller-installer of carpeting claimed profit damages when the buyer refused delivery
of more than 17,000 yards of carpet that were intended to cover an apartment complex. Id. at 147, 380 A.2d at 620. The court astutely explained why section 2-708(2)'s
"due credit for proceeds of resale" language is inapplicable to the lost-volume seller:
Logically, lost volume status, which entitles the seller to the § 2-708(2) formula
rather than that found in § 2-708(1), is inconsistent with a credit for proceeds
of resale. The whole concept of lost volume is that the sale of the goods to the
resale purchaser could have been made with other goods had there been no
breach. In essence, the original sale and the second sale are independent
events, becoming related only after breach, as the original sale goods are applied to the second sale. To require a credit for the proceeds of resale is to
deny the essential element that entitles the lost volume seller to § 2-708(2) in
the first place-the mutual independence of the contract and the resale.
Id. at 153, 380 A.2d at 625 (emphasis added).
118. See W. HAWKLAND, supra note 6, at 332: "[N]o matter how many cars the
seller may sell in a given period, he would have sold one more had the [original]
buyer not breached."The opportunity to sell to customer 2 is not something which is
left with the plaintiff as a result of the breach. "The only 'saving' that the buyer's
breach makes possible [and that is properly subtracted when computing seller's damages] is the 'cost' of producing or procuring the subject of the sale; the seller is enabled to make one new sale without incurring the cost of a second article of the kind."
A. CORBIN, supra note 15, at 542.
119. To put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done, he
should be given the contract price minus his "cost of procurement." A. CORBIN, sapra
note 15, at 542. For a manufacturer, this will be contract price less variable costs of
production. See, e.g., Louisville v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1973)
(parking meters); Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967)
(imported cloth processing). For dealers and other middlemen (wholesalers), the measure of damages will be contract price less middleman's purchase price. See DistribuDor, Inc. v. Karadnis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1970).
Lost profit damages for both middlemen and manufacturers are measured by the
"gross profit" on the lost sale with no subtraction made for a seller's "fixed" overhead
costs. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 629 F.2d
1118 (8th Cir. 1980); accord Scullin Steel Co. v. Paccar, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 756 (Mo.
App. 1986). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347, comment f (1979)
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However, if the plaintiff-seller has made special sales efforts
outside the scope of his normal business operations in an effort to
"unload" the item which the buyer has refused to accept, then resale
looks less like a normal sale in the regular course of his business and
more like an efficient replacement of the breached sale.120 Such special efforts might include advertising, soliciting customers when the
seller usually trades off street traffic, or highlighting the breached
item on the showroom floor. 12' Any of these actions would tend to
indicate that the seller would not have solicited the ultimate resale
purchaser except for the breach; 12 2 therefore, any lost volume is
illusory.
2.

The ParticularNeeds of the Buyer

The most frequently neglected factor in lost-volume seller status cases is the resale buyer's particular needs. 122 Professor Sebert
notes that without a close examination of this question, a court cannot determine whether the particular buyer would have bought from
the seller even if the original buyer had not breached. 24 To illustrate, if the resale buyer was in the market only for an orange convertible which he could buy "off the lot," and the seller only had
such a car because the original buyer breached his special order contract, there is no lost volume even though the dealer passed the capacity test 25 and even though he took no special actions to resell
the vehicle.1 26 On the other hand, if the resale buyer was in the mar(lost volume seller entitled only to recovery of "net profits"). The first circuit, in
Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d 865 (1st Cir. 1982), strongly disagreed with the RESTATEMENT position, finding that a net profit recovery does not
give the aggrieved seller his "reasonable overhead" as specifically provided by section
2-708(2). Id. at 868-69 n.4.
120. See Sebert, supra note 4 at 388-90.
121. See id. at 388-89 n.120.
122. The normal seller's remedy in this situation would be under section 2-706.
123. In the following cases, the court determined lost-volume seller status without identifying an actual, or even a putative, resale purchaser: Islamic Republic of
Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 957 (1986)
(aircraft parts); Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co.,
629 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1980) (blood plasma); Autonumerics, Inc. v. Bayer Indus.,
Inc., 144 Ariz. 181, 696 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. App. 1984) (custom built control systems);
Capital Steel Co., Inc. v. Foster & Creighton Co., 264 Ark. 683, 574 S.W.2d 256 (1978)
(steel).
124. Sebert, supra note 4, at 388. There is always the possibility that even the
overstocked dealer or the manufacturer with excess capacity might not be able to
meet the resale buyer's peculiar needs without the refused goods on hand. Id.
125. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the capacity question branch of this comment's lost volume test.
126. Similarly, if time was of the essence for the resale purchaser, he may have
bought his car from the dealer only because the particular repudiated vehicle was
immediately available. Because the vehicle's immediate availability was a result of
the original breach, the resale is not a wholly independent event and the seller has
not lost any volume; he has merely replaced the breached sale.
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ket for a Chevrolet of the same general type and style of the car that
the original buyer refused, then it seems likely that the dealer would
have sold some type of car to the resale purchaser anyway. In that
case, the original buyer's breach has effectively cost the dealer one
sale and, therefore, one profit.
3.

The Particular Goods

In theory, an investigation into the subjective mindsets and objective manifestations of both the buyer and the seller should be
sufficient to determine whether a resale is a wholly independent
sales event. 1 7 In practice, however, this can be a nebulous inquiry
with few reliable guideposts. 2 ' The trier of fact must therefore also
consider the characteristics of the particular good that the original
buyer rejected and that the resale buyer subsequently purchased. In
general, the more unusual or specialized the particular item, the
more likely that its subsequent resale is merely a replacement sale,
the result of special sales efforts or the similarly peculiar tastes of
the resale buyer.' 2 For example, if the seller's actions are ambiguous
and it is difficult to tell from the buyer's testimony whether he
would have bought a different car if the breached one had not been
available, the fact that it was an odd color might rightly lead the
factfinder to conclude that it was a replacement sale rather than a
wholly independent sales event.
C. Burdens of Proof
If the scenarios in part IV of this comment'"0 create the impression that most retailers will qualify as lost-volume sellers, that is
127. See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
seller and resale purchaser's roles in determining lost-volume seller status.
128. See Shanker, supra note 41 (so-called "volume" dealers should be limited
to one profit because of insurmountable difficulties in proving lost volume); Sebert,
supra note 4, at 389 n.123 (most lost-volume sellers will settle for a lesser recovery
under 2-706 because of the difficulty of proving lost volume and the increased litigation costs of trying to).
129. Perhaps this is why comment 2 to section 2-708 refers to "fixed-priced"
articles. If a dealer's goods are all "standard" (that is, part of a regular line and not
made to specifications of buyer) and "fixed-priced," it is much more likely that resales of such non-specific goods will be wholly independent sales events; the seller will
not have to make special efforts to unload a standard stock item and a resale purchaser would buy the identical item off the shelf even if the particular item refused
by the original buyer was not available.
Nonetheless, despite its probative value and support in the language of comment
2, no court has adopted a statutory interpretation limiting a section 2-708(2) profit
remedy to only those lost volume sellers who deal in standard, fixed-price articles.
See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text for the origins of comment 2 to section
2-708.
130. See supra notes 115-22.
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probably correct. 31 Therefore, in the case of retail dealers and
wholesaling middlemen, their status as such should be sufficient to
establish a prima facie case that the resale was a wholly independent
sales event from the original sale. 3 ' Lost-volume determinations,
however, are much more difficult to make in the case of manufacturer-sellers. 8 A manufacturer-seller should therefore be required
to produce additional evidence in order to establish a prima facie
case."8 A manufacturer must show that he did not produce goods to
the original buyer's unusual specifications, nor make special solicitation efforts to complete the subsequent resale, i.e., that he sold to
the ultimate resale purchaser in the normal course of business. The
defendant-original buyer could, of course, rebut the seller's prima
facie case by showing that the resale purchaser did, in fact, buy only
because the specific goods refused by the original buyer were

available. 8

5

131. See Sebert, supra note 4, at 389 (most merchants of relatively standard
goods will be lost-volume sellers); Childres and Burgess, supra note 4 (section 2708(2) the primary seller's remedy under the Code). But see Goetz & Scott, supra
note 75 (even most merchant sellers unlikely to have lost volume as consequence of
buyer's breach).
132. A virtual presumption that dealers should be afforded a profit remedy is at
least implicit in comment 2 to section 2-708(2), which says the profit remedy is available in "all appropriate cases, which would include all standard priced goods" (an
apparent reference to the automobile dealer cases). See N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM., 1
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1955 REPORT, 693 (reprint ed. 1980).
133. Manufacturers are more likely than either dealers or middlemen to (1) procure the goods upon special order; (2) sell articles that are neither "fixed-priced" nor
standard; and, (3) make special solicitations if the buyer refuses delivery on what will
normally be a large volume of goods. All these factors suggest that fewer manufacturer-sellers will be legitimate lost-volume sellers.
134. See supra note 13 for factors which make a manufacturer's lost volume
status inherently more debatable.
135. The burden of ultimately proving his lost-volume status remains, at all
times, with the seller because the language of 2-708(2) requires an affirmative showing that section 2-708(1) damages are "inadequate." Famous Knitwear Corp. v. Drug
Fair, 493 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1974); R. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 394. It is only the
burden of proceeding that shifts to the defendant-buyer once the seller has established his prima facie case of lost volume. See supra notes 105-29 and accompanying
text for factors tending to indicate seller has suffered no lost volume.
If either the district or appellate courts in the Davis case had applied the test
proposed in this comment, it is not clear what the result would have been. There are
simply too few factual details in the reported opinion. Assuming, however, that
Diasonics was a seller with excess manufacturing capacity, then on remand, Diasonics' status as a lost-volume seller should turn on whether the subsequent resale of the
equipment was a wholly independent event.
To establish a prima facie case on this element, Diasonics would need to show
that they did not produce the equipment to Davis' unusual specifications, i.e., the
manufactured equipment was essentially fungible, and that they resold the rejected
diagnostic equipment in the normal course of business- without any unusual solicitation efforts. Davis could then rebut this prima facie case by offering not only evidence that Diasonics made special solicitation efforts or that the rejected goods were
made to particularly unusual specifications, but also any evidence that the resale purchaser would not have bought from Diasonics but for the contemporaneous availability of this particulardiagnostic equipment.
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CONCLUSION

If Illinois courts agree with the seventh circuit that lost-volume
sellers are entitled to a profit remedy under Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-708(2), they will face the difficult but necessary task
of deciding which sellers are entitled to this remedy. Courts in other
jurisdictions have too frequently permitted a profit remedy to undeserving sellers because previous lost-volume seller definitions were
either inadequate or poorly applied. Because it comports with the
general damages philosophy of the U.C.C. and produces results consistent with the general common law theory of contract damages,
Illinois courts should adopt the two-step analysis of "capacity" and
"wholly independent sales event" to ensure that the section 2-708(2)
profit remedy is only available to true lost-volume sellers.
Jerald B. Holisky

